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Abstract. In this paper we reconsider the definition of counts-as relations in
normative multiagent systems: counts-as relations do not always provide directly
an abstract interpretation of brute facts in terms of institutional facts. We argue
that in many cases the inference of institutional facts from brute facts is the result
of actions of agents acting on behalf of the normative systems and who are in
charge of recognizing which institutional facts follow from brute facts. We call
this relation delegation of power: it is composed of a counts-as relation specifying
that the effect of an action of an agent is an institutional fact and by a goal of the
normative system that the fact is considered as an institutional fact. This relation
is more complex than institutional empowerment, where an action of an agent
counts-as an action of the normative system but no goal is involved, and than
delegation of goals, where a goal is delegated to an agent without giving it any
power. With two case studies we show the importance of the delegation of power.
Finally, we show how the new definition can be related with existing ones by
using different levels of abstraction.
1 Introduction
It is well known that normative systems include not only regulative norms like obliga-
tions, prohibitions and permissions, but also constitutive norms stating what counts as
institutional facts in a normative system.
In this paper we introduce a new notion, called delegation of power beside constitu-
tive and regulative norms. Thus, the research questions of this paper are:
– What is delegation of power in a normative multiagent system?
– How does it relate to counts-as conditionals?
– How does it relates to regulative norms?
The notion of counts-as introduced by Searle [1] has been interpreted in deontic
logic in different ways and it seems to refer to different albeit related phenomena [2].
For example, Jones and Sergot [3] consider counts-as from the constitutive point of
view. According to Jones and Sergot , the fact that A counts-as B in context C is read as
a statement to the effect that A represents conditions for guaranteeing the applicability
of particular classificatory categories. The counts-as guarantees the soundness of that
inference, and enables “new” classifications which would otherwise not hold.
An alternative view of the counts-as relation is proposed by Grossi et al. [4]: accord-
ing to the classificatory perspective A counts-as B in context C is interpreted as: A is
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classified as B in context C. In other words, the occurrence of A is a sufficient condition,
in context C, for the occurrence of B. Via counts-as statements, normative systems can
establish the ontology they use in order to distribute obligations, rights, prohibitions,
permissions, etc.
In [5, 6] we propose a different view of counts-as which focuses on the fact that
counts-as often provides an abstraction mechanism in terms of institutional facts, al-
lowing the regulative rules to refer to legal notions which abstract from details.
None of the above analyses, however, considers the motivational aspects behind con-
stitutive norms required by agent theory. Constitutive norms are modelled as counts-as
conditionals which allow to infer which institutional facts follow from brute facts and
from existing institutional facts. E.g., a car counts as a vehicle for the traffic law. The
inference from facts to institutional facts is considered as automatic, i.e., it is assumed
not to need any agent or resource to perform it. Agent theory, instead, considers also
the resources needed to perform inferences. Calculating the consequences following
from some premises has a cost which must be traded off against the benefit of making
the inferences. Thus in Georgeff and Ingrand [7] inferences are considered as actions
which are planned and subject to decision processes as any other action: there must be
an agent taking the decision and executing them.
According to resource bounded reasoning, the assumption made above on constitu-
tive rules, even if useful in some circumstances, is not realistic. In many circumstances
facts which in principle should be considered as institutional facts are not recognized
as such. In such circumstances, the interpretation of a fact as an institutional fact may
depend on the action of some agent who acts to achieve a goal of the normative system
that a brute fact is interpreted as an institutional fact: we say that this agent has been
delegated the power to interpret the fact as an institutional fact. In the next section two
such examples are considered.
To answer the research questions of this paper we use our normative multiagent
system framework [5, 8] which explicitly takes into account the activity of agents in
the definition of sanction based obligations. The basic assumptions of our model are
that beliefs, goals and desires of an agent are represented by conditional rules, and
that, when an agent takes a decision, it recursively models the other agents interfering
with it in order to predict their reaction to its decision as in a game. Most importantly,
the normative system itself can be conceptualized as a socially constructed agent with
whom it is possible to play games to understand what will be its reaction to the agent’s
decision: to consider its behavior as a violation and to sanction it. These actions are
carried out by agents playing roles in the normative system, like judges and policemen.
In the model presented in [5, 6], regulative norms are represented by the goals of the
normative system and constitutive norms as its beliefs.
We relate the notion of delegation of power with our previous work on norms pro-
viding the definition of counts-as and of obligations at different levels of abstraction
depending on whether agents are considered or not as acting for the normative system.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we show two case studies motivating
the paper. In Section 3 we introduce delegation of power and in Section 4 we distin-
guish three different levels of abstraction. In Section 5 we introduce the formal model
explained by examples. Comparison with related work and conclusion end the paper.
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2 Motivating Examples
To illustrate the necessity of the notion of delegation of power we resort to two moti-
vating case studies. The first one is a case which happened to one of the authors. The
second case concerns how the law deals with the enforcement of obligations.
The first example is about traffic norms. Due to increased levels of pollution, on
certain days, only ecological vehicles are allowed in major towns. In particular, cars
with a catalytic converter count as ecological vehicles. One author of this paper bought
many years ago one of the first catalytic cars. So he felt permitted to go around by car in
the days when non-catalytic cars were prohibited. Instead, he was stopped by the police
and fined. Why? The car was bought before the local law recognized catalytic cars as
ecological vehicles. The police agreed that the car had a catalytic converter: they could
see it, the car worked only with unleaded fuel, both the manual and the licence of the
car said it has a catalytic converter. However, there was a missing rubber stamp by the
office declaring that the car counts as an ecological vehicle. The problem is not simply
that only catalytic cars bought after a certain date are considered as ecological. Rather, a
catalytic car is not ecological unless an agent officialy recognizes it as such. The police
has no power to consider the car as ecological, the evidence notwithstanding.
The moral is that even if a brute fact is present and could allow the recognition of an
institutional fact, the institutional fact is the result of the action of some agent who is
empowered to do that.
The second example concerns how obligations are dealt with by the law. Obligations
represent the social order the law aims to achieve. However, specifying this order is not
sufficient to achieve it. Thus, obligations are associated with other instrumental norms
- to use Hart [9]’s terminology: the lack of the wanted state of affairs is considered as
a violation and the violator is sanctioned. These tasks are distributed to distinct agents,
like judges and policemen, who have to decide whether and how to fulfill them.
There is, however, an asymmetry between considering something as a violation and
sanctioning. The latter can be a physical action like putting into jail, while the former
has always an institutional character. So, while the sanction can be directly performed
by a policeman, the recognition of a violation can only be performed indirectly by
means of some action which counts as the recognition of a violation, e.g., a trial by a
judge.
The two examples have some similarities and differences. Both in case of ecological
cars and in case of violations an action of an agent is necessary to create the institutional
fact. These cases can be modelled by a counts-as relation between the action of an agent
(putting a stamp on the car licence or recognizing a violation) and the institutional
fact (being an ecological vehicle or having violated an obligation), rather than by a
direct counts-as relation between the brute facts and the institutional facts. But at first
sight the two cases also have a difference: the recognition of a violation is wanted
by the normative system to achieve its social order. In this case besides the counts-
as rule between the action and the recognition as a violation there is also the goal of
the normative system that this recognition contributes to the social order. In the next
section we argue that indeed both cases should be modelled by means of a goal of
the normative system and a counts-as relation between actions of agents acting for the
normative system and institutional facts: they are both examples of delegation of power.
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3 Goal Delegation and the Delegation of Power
In this section we show how both examples of Section 2 can be modelled in the same
way, starting from the analysis of two apparently unrelated phenomena: goal delegation
and institutional empowerment.
According to Castelfranchi [10], goal delegation is relying on another agent for the
achievement of one own’s goal: “in delegation an agent A needs or likes an action of
another agent B and includes it in its own plan. In other words, A is trying to achieve
some of its goals through B’s behaviours or actions; thus A has the goal that B performs
a given action/behaviour.” This is not an institutional phenomenon but a basic capability
of agents which enables them to interact with each other.
Institutional empowerment, instead, is by nature an institutional phenomenon which
is based on the counts-as relation: an agent is empowered to perform an institutional
action - a kind of institutional fact - if some of its actions counts as the institutional
action. For example, a director can commit by means of his signature his institution to
purchase some goods. Thus it is essentially related to counts-as rules, albeit restricted
to actions of agents. Consider as a paradigmatic case the work by Jones and Sergot [3]
Bottazzi and Ferrario [11] argue that the two phenomena are related, as in cases like
the two examples of Section 2: an agent which is institutionally empowered, is also
delegated the goal of the institution of making true an institutional fact by exercising its
power in the specified situations.
The connection between goal delegation and institutional empowerment is not a nec-
essary one. For example, the agent in charge for sanctioning an obligation is delegated
the goal of sanctioning, but there is no need of institutional powers in case of physical
sanctions. Viceversa, the law institutionally empowers agents to stipulate private con-
tracts which have the force of law, without being delegated by the law to do so, since
contracting agents act for their own sake [5].
This connection, which we call delegation of power, can be used to explain the two
examples above. In the case of cars, for the normative system, catalytic cars have to
be considered as ecological vehicles. There are three possibilities: first, recognizing all
catalytic cars as ecological vehicles by means of a constitutive norm. This solution,
however, does not consider the actual performance of the inference and the possible
costs related to it. Second, the normative system can rely on some agent to recognize
catalytic cars as ecological vehicles. As said above, this can be done by means of a
counts-as relation between an action of an agent and its effects. This solution, however,
fails to account for the motivations that the agent should have to perform the action
of recognizing ecological vehicles as such. Third, also a goal of the normative system
is added to motivate its action: there is an agent who has the institutional power to
recognize cars as ecological vehicles and the normative system has delegated it the goal
that it does so in order to motivate it.
In the case of obligations, beside the counts-as relation between an action of judge
and the institutional fact that a violation is recognized, we have the goal that the spec-
ified behavior is considered as a violation. The goal is an instrumental goal asso-
ciated with the definition of obligation which aims at regulating how violations are
prosecuted.
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Thus to model delegation of power we need a model where:
– Both constitutive and regulative norms are modelled.
– Since we want to model goal delegation, mental attitudes are attributed to the nor-
mative system.
– Agents act inside the normative system.
All these features are present in our model of normative multiagent systems [5]. Our
model is based on the so called agent metaphor: social entities like normative systems
can be conceptualized as agents by attributing them mental attitudes like beliefs and
goals. The cognitive motivations of the agent metaphor underlying our framework are
discussed in [12].
Beliefs model the constitutive rules of the normative system, while goals model reg-
ulative rules. Thus, in the normative system the interaction between constitutive and
regulative rules is the same as the interaction of beliefs and goals in an agent.
However, differently from a real agent, the normative system is a socially constructed
agent. It exists only because of the collective acceptance by all the agents and, thus,
it cannot act in the world. Its actions are carried out by agents playing roles in the
normative system, like legislators, judges and policemen. It is a social construction
used to coordinate the behavior of the agents.
Our model of roles, which allows to structure organizations in sub-organizations and
roles to make a multiagent system modular and thus manage its complexity, is described
in [13]. For space reason, we do not introduce roles explicitly in this paper.
In our model obligations are not only modelled as goals of the normative system, but
they are also associated with the instrumental goals that the behavior of the addressee of
the norms is considered as a violation and that the violation is sanctioned. Considering
something as a violation and sanctioning are actions which can be executed by the
normative system itself, or, at a more concrete level of detail, by agents playing roles in
the normative system.
The counts-as relation in our model is modelled as a conditional belief of the norma-
tive system to provide an abstraction of reality in terms of institutional facts. Regulative
norms can refer to this level, thus decoupling them from the details of reality. For exam-
ple, it must be distinguished the institutional fact that traffic lights are red from the brute
fact that red light bulbs in the traffic lights are on: in the extreme case the institutional
fact can be true even if all the red bulbs are broken. As a consequence, as discussed in
[6, 14], we do not accept the identity rule for counts-as.
In this paper, we consider how counts-as can be used to define delegation of power.
Counts-as relations are not used in this case to directly connect brute facts to institu-
tional facts, but only to express the (institutional) effects of actions of agents empowered
by the normative system (in the same sense as the act of signing of the director counts
as the commitment of the institution he belongs to).
In our model [5], constitutive rules have also other roles, in particular, they specify
how the normative system can change. In this sense a normative multiagent system is
a system in the sense that it specifies itself how it can change. Since it is a socially
constructed agent, it cannot directly change itself. Rather it relies on the actions of
agents playing roles in it, like legislators, which count as changes of the system.
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4 Level of Abstractions in the Definition of Norms
Obligations and counts-as relations can be defined at different levels of abstraction.
We identify three different levels of abstraction, which are suited for different applica-
tions. The abstraction dimension is the detail at which we consider agents acting for
the normative system: at the higher abstraction level agents have no role, at the middle
abstraction level only actions of the normative system are considered but agents are
not considered; only at the more concrete level, where agents are in charge of the ac-
tual functioning of the normative system concerning regulative and constitutive rules,
delegation of power enters the picture:
1. The higher level abstracts from the fact that violations, sanctions and institutional
facts are the result of the action that an agent decides to perform. Thus obligations
are defined as in Anderson’s reduction [15]: the recognition of the violation and the
sanction logically follow from the violation. This abstraction level for regulative
rules is adopted also by [16, 17] and we use it in [18]. For constitutive rules, up to
our knowledge, this is the only level considered.
2. The middle level abstracts from the role of agents in the normative system, but the
normative system is in some way personified and is assumed to act in the world:
thus the recognition of violations and sanctions are considered as the actions of the
normative system itself. We adopt this level of representation for regulative norms
in [5, 8]. Analogously, institutional facts follow from actions of the normative sys-
tem: they are not anymore logical consequences of facts, but consequences of deci-
sions of the normative systems which are traded-off against other decisions. They,
thus, do not follow automatically, since the normative system can take a different
decision due to conflicts with other goals or to lack of resources.
3. The lower level takes into account the actions of the agents in the normative sys-
tem. Concerning regulative norms, some agents are delegated the goal to sanction
violations and the goal and power of recognizing violations. I.e., they are delegated
the power to do so. Concerning constitutive norms, the agents are delegated the
goal to recognize some facts as institutional facts and the power to do so by means
of their actions. I.e., they are delegated the power to do so. The problem of agents
recognizing violations has been partially addressed in [19], but the recognition ac-
tion was considered as a physical action like the sanction. In this paper we add the
counts-as relation to the recognition of violations.
At the lower two levels it becomes possible to answer the question whether consti-
tutive norms can be violated like it happens for regulative ones. A constitutive norm
can be violated in the sense that the normative system or the agent who is delegated
the goal to recognize the institutional fact and empowered to do so fails to achieve the
delegated goal. In our first example the office could fail or refuse to recognize the car as
an ecological vehicle. The reason can be the inability to perform the necessary actions,
laziness, bribing, etc., like it happens for regulative norms. Moreover, constitutive rules
can be abused, in the sense that the delegated agent can exercise its power without being
delegated to do so in the given circumstances. This possibility assumes that the institu-
tional power can be exercised beyond the conditions under which it has been delegated
the goal to exercise it.
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5 The Formal Model
The definition of the agents is inspired by the rule based BOID architecture [20], though
in our theory, and in contrast to BOID, obligations are not taken as primitive concepts.
Beliefs, desires and goals are represented by conditional rules rather than in a modal
framework. Intentions have been introduced as a form of bounded rationality: since
an agent has not enough resources to make the optimal decision at each moment, he
maintains its previous choices. In this paper we consider only one decision, so we do
not need to introduce intentions to model decisions which persist over time.
5.1 Input/Output Logic
To represent conditional mental attitudes we take a simplified version of the input/output
logics introduced in [21, 22]. A rule set is a set of ordered pairs P → q. For each such
pair, the body P is thought of as an input, representing some condition or situation, and
the head q is thought of as an output, representing what the rule tells us to be believed,
desirable, obligatory or whatever in that situation. In this paper, to keep the formal
exposition simple, input and output are respectively a set of literals and a literal.
The development of input/output logic has been motivated by conditional norms,
which do not have a truth value. For that reason, the semantics of input/output logic
given by Makinson and van der Torre [21] is an operational semantics, which charac-
terizes the output as a function of the input and the set of norms. However, it is easy
to define a classical semantics for conditional norms too. Makinson and van der Torre
illustrate how to recapture input/output logic in modal logic, and thus give it a clas-
sical possible worlds semantics. More elegantly, as illustrated by Bochman [23], the
operational semantics of input/output logic can be rephrased as a bimodel semantics, in
which a model of a set of conditionals is a pair of partial models from the base logic (in
this paper, propositional logic).
Though the development of input/output logic has been motivated by the logic of
norms, the same logic can be used for other conditionals like conditional beliefs and
conditional goals – which explains the more general name of the formal system. More-
over, Bochman [23] also illustrates how the same logic is used for causal reasoning and
various non-monotonic reasoning formalisms.
Definition 1 (Input/output logic). Let X be a set of propositional variables, the set of
literals built from X , written as Lit(X), is X ∪ {¬x | x ∈ X}, and the set of rules
built from X , written as Rul(X) = 2Lit(X) × Lit(X), is the set of pairs of a set of
literals built from X and a literal built from X , written as {l1, . . . , ln} → l. We also
write l1 ∧ . . .∧ ln → l and when n = 0 we write  → l. For x ∈ X we write ∼x for ¬x
and ∼(¬x) for x. Moreover, let Q be a set of pointers to rules and RD : Q → Rul(X)
is a total function from the pointers to the set of rules built from X .
Let S = RD(Q) be a set of rules {P1 → q1, . . . , Pn → qn}, and consider the
following proof rules strengthening of the input (SI), disjunction of the input (OR),
cumulative transitivity (CT) and Identity (Id) defined as follows:
p → r
p ∧ q → rSI
p ∧ q → r, p ∧ ¬q → r
p → r OR
p → q, p ∧ q → r
p → r CT p → pId
Delegation of Power in Normative Multiagent Systems 43
The following output operators are defined as closure operators on the set S using
the rules above.
out1: SI (simple-minded output) out3: SI+CT (reusable output)
out2: SI+OR (basic output) out4: SI+OR+CT (basic reusable output)
Moreover, the following four throughput operators are defined as closure
operators on the set S. out+i : out i+Id (throughput) We write out(Q) for any of
these output operations and out+(Q) for any of these throughput operations. We
also write l ∈ out(Q,L) iff L → l ∈ out(Q), and l ∈ out+(Q,L) iff
L → l ∈ out+(Q).
Example 1. Given RD(Q) = {a → x, x → z} the output of Q contains x ∧ a → z
using the rule SI . Using also the CT rule, the output contains a → z. a → a follows
only if there is the Id rule.
A technical reason to distinguish pointers from rules is to facilitate the description of
the priority ordering we introduce in the following definition.
The notorious contrary-to-duty paradoxes such as Chisholm’s and Forrester’s para-
dox have led to the use of constraints in input/output logics [22]. The strategy is to adapt
a technique that is well known in the logic of belief change - cut back the set of norms
to just below the threshold of making the current situation inconsistent.
Definition 2 (Constraints). Let ≥: 2Q × 2Q be a transitive and reflexive partial rela-
tion on the powerset of the pointers to rules containing at least the subset relation and
RD : Q → Rul(X) a function from the pointers to the set of rules. Moreover, let out
be an input/output logic:
– maxfamily(Q,P ) is the set of ⊆-maximal subsets Q′ of Q such that out(Q′, P )∪P
is consistent.
– preffamily(Q,P,≥) is the set of ≥-maximal elements of maxfamily(Q,P ).
– outfamily(Q,P,≥) is the output under the elements of preffamily, i.e.,
{out(Q′, P ) | Q′ ∈ preffamily(Q,P,≥)}.
– P → x ∈ out∪(Q,≥) iff x ∈ ∪outfamily(Q,P,≥)
P → x ∈ out∩(Q,≥) iff x ∈ ∩outfamily(Q,P,≥)
Example 2. Let RD({a, b, c}) = {a = ( → m), b = (p → n), c = (o → ¬m)},
{b, c} > {a, b} > {a, c}, where by A > B we mean as usual A ≥ B and B ≥ A.
maxfamily(Q, {o}) = {{a, b}, {b, c}},
preffamily(Q, {o},≥) = {{b, c}},
outfamily(Q, {o},≥) = {{¬m}}
The maxfamily includes the sets of applicable compatible pointers to rules together
with all non applicable ones: e.g., the output of {a, c} in the context {o} is not con-
sistent. Finally {a} is not in maxfamily since it is not maximal, we can add the non
applicable rule b. Then preffamily is the preferred set {b, c} according to the ordering
on set of rules above. The set outfamily is composed by the consequences of applying
the rules {b, c} which are applicable in o (c): ¬m.
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Due to space limitations we have to be brief on details with respect to input/output
logics, see [21, 22] for the semantics of input/output logics, further details on its proof
theory, its possible translation to modal logic, alternative constraints, and examples.
5.2 Multiagent Systems
We assume that the base language contains boolean variables and logical connectives.
The variables are either decision variables of an agent, which represent the agent’s ac-
tions and whose truth value is directly determined by it, or parameters, which describe
both the state of the world and institutional facts, and whose truth value can only be
determined indirectly. Our terminology is borrowed from Lang et al. [24] and is used
in discrete event systems, and many formalisms in operations research.
Given the same set of mental attitudes, agents reason and act differently: when facing
a conflict among their motivations and beliefs, different agents prefer to fulfill different
goals and desires. We express these agent characteristics by a priority relation on the
mental attitudes which encode, as detailed in [20], how the agent resolves its conflicts.
The priority relation is defined on the powerset of the mental attitudes such that a wide
range of characteristics can be described, including social agents that take the desires
or goals of other agents into account. The priority relation contains at least the subset-
relation which expresses a kind of independence among the motivations.
Background knowledge is formalized by a set of effects E represented by rules.
Definition 3 (Agent set). An agent set is a tuple 〈A,X,B,D,G,AD , E,≥,≥E〉,
where:
– the agents A, propositional variables X , agent beliefs B, desires D, goals G, and
effects E are six finite disjoint sets.
– B,D,G are sets of mental attitudes. We write M = D ∪ G for the motivations
defined as the union of the desires and goals.
– an agent description AD : A → 2X∪B∪M is a total function that maps each agent
to sets of variables (its decision variables), beliefs, desires and goals, but that does
not necessarily assign each variable to at least one agent. For each agent b ∈ A,
we write Xb for X ∩ AD(b), and Bb for B ∩ AD(b), Db for D ∩ AD(b), etc. We
write parameters P = X \ ∪b∈AXb.
– the set of effects E represents the background knowledge of all agents.
– a priority relation ≥: A → 2B ×2B ∪2M ×2M is a function from agents to a tran-
sitive and reflexive partial relation on the powerset of the motivations containing
at least the subset relation. We write ≥b for ≥ (b).
– a priority relation ≥E : 2E × 2E is a transitive and reflexive partial relation on the
powerset of effects containing at least the subset relation.
Example 3. A = {a}, Xa = {drive}, P = {s, catalytic}, Da = {d1, d2},
≥a= {d2} ≥ {d1}. There is a single agent, agent a, who can drive a car. Moreover,
it can be sanctioned and the car can be catalytic. It has two desires, one to drive (d1),
another one not to be sanctioned (d2). The second desire is more important.
In a multiagent system, beliefs, desires, goals and effects are abstract concepts which
are described by rules built from literals.
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Definition 4 (Multiagent system). A multiagent system, written as NMAS , is a tuple
〈A,X,B,D,G,AD , E,RD ,≥,≥E〉, where 〈A,X,B,D,G,AD , E,≥,≥E〉 is
an agent set, and the rule description RD : (B ∪ M ∪ E) → Rul(X) is a total
function from the sets of beliefs, desires and goals, and effects to the set of rules built
from X . For a set of pointers S ⊆ B ∪ M ∪ E, we write RD(S) = {RD(q) | q ∈ S}.
Example 4 (Continued). RD(d1) =  → drive , RD(d2) =  → ¬s.
In the description of the normative system, we do not introduce norms explicitly, but we
represent several concepts which are illustrated in the following sections. Institutional
facts (I) represent legal abstract categories which depend on the beliefs of the normative
system and have no direct counterpart in the world. F = X \ I are what Searle calls
“brute facts”: physical facts like the actions of the agents and their effects. V (x,a)
represents the decision of agent n that recognizes x as a violation by agent a. The goal
distribution GD(a) ⊆ Gn represents the goals of agent n the agent a is responsible for.
Definition 5 (Normative system). A normative multiagent system, written as NMAS ,
is a tuple 〈A,X,B,D,G,AD , E,RD ,≥,≥E,n, I, V,GD〉 where the tuple
〈A,X,B,D,G,AD , E,RD ,≥,≥E〉 is a multiagent system, and
– the normative system n ∈ A is an agent.
– the institutional facts I ⊆ P are a subset of the parameters.
– the norm description V : Lit(X)×A → Xn ∪P is a function from the literals and
the agents to the decision variables of the normative system and the parameters.
– the goal distribution GD : A → 2Gn is a function from the agents to the powerset
of the goals of the normative system, such that if L → l ∈ RD(GD(a)), then
l ∈ Lit(Xa ∪ P ).
Agent n is a normative system with the goal that non catalytic cars are not driven.
Example 5 (Continued). There is agent n, representing the normative system.
P = {s, V (drive , a), catalytic}, Dn = Gn = {g1},
RD(g1) = {¬catalytic → ¬drive}, GD(a) = {g1}.
The parameter V (drive,a) represents the fact that the normative system considers a
violation agent a’s action of driving. It has the goal that non-ecological vehicles should
not be driven by a and it has distributed this goal to agent a.
In the following, we use an input/output logic out to define whether a desire or goal
implies another one and to define the application of a set of belief rules to a set of
literals; in both cases we use the out3 operation since it has the desired logical property
of not satisfying identity.
We now define obligations and counts-as at the three levels of abstraction.
Regulative norms are conditional obligations with an associated sanction. At the
higher level of abstraction, the definition contains three clauses: the first two clauses
state that recognitions of violations and sanctions are a consequence of the behavior of
agent a, as it is represented by the background knowledge rules E. For an obligation to
be effective, the third clause states that the sanction must be disliked by its addressee.
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Definition 6 (Obligation (level 1)). Let NMAS be a normative multiagent system
〈A,X,B,D,G,AD , E,RD ,≥,≥E,n, I, V,GD〉.
Agent a ∈ A is obliged to see to it that x ∈ Lit(Xa ∪ P ) with sanction s ∈ Lit(P )
in context Y ⊆ Lit(X) in NMAS , written as NMAS |= O1an(x, s|Y ), if and only if:
1. Y ∪ {∼x} → V (∼x,a) ∈ out(E,≥E): if Y and x is false, then it follows that ∼x
is a violation by agent a.
2. Y ∪{V (∼x,a)} → s ∈ out(E,≥E): if Y and there is a violation by agent a, then
it is sanctioned.
3. Y →∼s ∈ out(Da,≥a): if Y , then agent a desires ∼s, which expresses that it
does not like to be sanctioned.
Example 6. Let: E = {e1, e2}, Da = {d2}
RD(e1) = {¬catalytic, drive} → V (drive ,a)
RD(e2) = {¬catalytic, V (drive,a)} → s
RD(d2) = ¬catalytic →∼s
NMAS |= O1an(¬drive , s | ¬catalytic), since:
1. {¬catalytic, drive} → V (drive,a) ∈ out(E,≥E)
2. {¬catalytic, V (drive ,a)} → s ∈ out(E,≥E)
3. ¬catalytic →∼s ∈ out(Da,≥a)
Constitutive norms introduce new abstract categories of existing facts and entities,
called institutional facts. In [6] we formalize the counts-as conditional as a belief rule
of the normative system n. Since the condition x of the belief rule is a variable it can be
an action of an agent, a brute fact or an institutional fact. So, the counts-as relation can
be iteratively applied. In our model the counts-as relation does not satisfy the identity
rule. See [6] for a discussion of the motivations.
Definition 7 (Counts-as relation (level 1)). Let NMAS be a normative multiagent
system 〈A,X,B,D,G,AD , E,RD ,≥,≥E,n, I, V,GD〉. A literal x ∈ Lit(X)
counts-as y ∈ Lit(I) in context C ⊆ Lit(X), NMAS |= counts-as1n(x, y|C), iff
C ∪ {x} → y ∈ out(Bn,≥n): if agent n believes C and x then it believes y.
Example 7. P \ I = {catalytic}, I = {eco}, Xa = {drive}, Bn = {b1}, RD(b1) =
catalytic → eco
Consequently, NMAS |= counts-as1n(catalytic, eco|). This formalizes that for
the normative system a catalytic car counts as an ecological vehicle. The presence of
the catalytic converter is a physical “brute” fact, while being an ecological vehicle is an
institutional fact. In situation S = {catalytic}, given Bn we have that the consequences
of the constitutive norms are out(Bn, S,≥n) = {eco} (since out3 does not include Id ).
At the middle level of abstraction, actions of the normative systems are added in the
definition of the obligations: the recognition of a violation and sanctions. Since the
actions undergo a decision process, desires and goals of the normative system are added.
The first and central clause of our definition of obligation defines obligations of agents
as goals of the normative system, following the “your wish is my command” metaphor.
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It says that the obligation is implied by the desires of the normative system n, implied
by the goals of agent n, and it has been distributed by agent n to the agent. The latter
two steps are represented by out(GD(a),≥n).
The second and third clause can be read as the normative system has the goal that
the absence of p is considered as a violation. The third clause says that the agent desires
that there are no violations, which is stronger than that it does not desire violations, as
would be expressed by  → V (∼x, a) ∈ out(Dn,≥n).
The fourth and fifth clause relate violations to sanctions. The fifth clause says that the
normative system is motivated not to sanction as long as their is no violation, because
otherwise the norm would have no effect. Finally, for the same reason the last clause
says that the agent does not like the sanction. The second and fourth clause can be
considered as instrumental norms [9] contributing to the achievement of the main goal
of the norm.
Definition 8 (Obligation (level 2)). Let NMAS be a normative multiagent system
〈A,X,B,D,G,AD , E,RD ,≥,≥E,n, I, V,GD〉. Agent a ∈ A is obliged to see to it
that x ∈ Lit(Xa ∪ P ) with sanction s ∈ Lit(Xn ∪ P ) in context Y ⊆ Lit(X) in
NMAS , written as NMAS |= O2an(x, s|Y ), if and only if:
1. Y → x ∈ out(Dn,≥n) ∩ out(GD(a),≥n): if Y holds then agent n desires and
has as a goal that x, and this goal has been distributed to agent a.
2. Y ∪ {∼x} → V (∼x,a) ∈ out(Dn,≥n) ∩ out(Gn,≥n): if Y holds and ∼x, then
agent n has the goal and the desire V (∼x,a): to recognize it as a violation by
agent a.
3.  → ¬V (∼x,a) ∈ out(Dn,≥n): agent n desires that there are no violations.
4. Y ∪ {V (∼x,a)} → s ∈ out(Dn,≥n) ∩ out(Gn,≥n): if Y holds and agent n
decides V (∼x,a), then agent n desires and has as a goal that it sanctions agent a.
5. Y →∼s ∈ out(Dn,≥n): if Y holds, then agent n desires not to sanction. This
desire of the normative system expresses that it only sanctions in case of violation.
6. Y →∼s ∈ out(Da,≥a): if Y holds, then agent a desires ∼s, which expresses that
it does not like to be sanctioned.
The rules in the definition of obligation are only motivations, and not beliefs, because
a normative system may not recognize that a violation counts as such, or that it does
not sanction it: it is up to its decision. Both the recognition of the violation and the
application of the sanction are the result of autonomous decisions of the normative
system that is modelled as an agent.
The beliefs, desires and goals of the normative agent - defining the obligations - are
not private mental states of an agent. Rather they are collectively attributed by the agents
of the normative system to the normative agent: they have a public character, and, thus,
which are the obligations of the normative system is a public information.
Example 8. Let: {g1, g2, g4} = Gn, Gn∪{g3, d2} = Dn, {g1} = GD(a), {d2} = Da
RD(g2) = {¬catalytic, drive} → V (drive ,a) RD(g3) =  → ¬V (drive , a)
RD(g4) = {¬catalytic, V (drive ,a)} → s
NMAS |= O2an(¬drive , s | ¬catalytic), since:
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1. ¬catalytic → ¬drive ∈ out(Dn,≥n) ∩ out(GD(a),≥n)
2. {¬catalytic, drive} → V (drive,a) ∈ out(Dn,≥n) ∩ out(Gn,≥n)
3.  → ¬V (drive , a) ∈ out(Dn,≥n)
4. {¬catalytic, V (drive ,a)} → s ∈ out(Dn,≥n) ∩ out(Gn,≥n)
5. ¬catalytic →∼s ∈ out(Dn,≥n)
6. ¬catalytic →∼s ∈ out(Da,≥a)
At the middle level of abstraction, the beliefs of the normative system represent only the
connections between actions and the consequences of these actions for the normative
system. The normative system has the desire and goal that the institutional fact y holds
if the fact x holds in context C. The normative system believes that to make y true it
has to perform an action z. Thus it is not sufficient the fact x holding in context C for
the institutional fact y to be true: it is necessary also a decision to do z by the normative
system.
Definition 9 (Counts-as relation (level 2)). Let NMAS be a normative multiagent
system 〈A,X,B,D,G,AD , E,RD ,≥,≥E,n, I, V,GD〉. A literal x ∈ Lit(X)
counts-as y ∈ Lit(I) in context C ⊆ Lit(X), NMAS |= counts-as2n(x, y|C), iff:
1. C ∧x → y ∈ out(Dn,≥n)∩out(Gn,≥n): it is a desire and goal of the normative
system that in context C the fact x is considered as the institutional fact y.
2. ∃z ∈ Xn such that C ∪ {z} → y ∈ out(Bn,≥n): there exists an action z of the
normative system n such that if it decides z in context C then it believes that the
institutional fact y follows (i.e., counts-as1n(z, y|C) at the first level of abstraction).
Example 9. P \ I = {catalytic}, I = {eco}, Xa = {drive}, Xn = {stamp}
Dn = Gn = {d3},RD(d3) = catalytic → eco
Bn = {b1}, RD(b1) = stamp → eco
Consequently, NMAS |= counts-as2n(catalytic, eco|). This formalizes that the
normative system wants that if a car is catalytic, then it is considered as an ecological
vehicle and the normative believes that from system putting a stamp on a catalytic car
licence follows the fact that the car is catalytic. In situation S = {catalytic}, given Bn
we have that the consequences of the constitutive norms are out(Bn, S,≥n) = ∅ and
thus the goal d3 remains unsatisfied, while in situation S′ = {catalytic, stamp} they
are out(Bn, S′,≥n) = {eco} and the goal d3 is satisfied.
The institutional facts can appear in the conditions of regulative norms:
Example 10. A regulative norm which forbids driving non catalytic cars can refer to
the abstract concept of ecological vehicle rather than to catalytic converters:
O2an(¬drive , s | ¬eco).
As the system evolves, new cases can be added to the notion of ecological vehicle by
means of new constitutive norms, without changing the regulative norms about it. E.g.,
if a car has fuel cells, then it is an ecological vehicle: fuelcell → eco ∈ RD(Bn).
This level of abstraction supposes that the normative system is an agent acting in the
world. This abstraction can be detailed by introducing agents acting on behalf of the
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normative system: the normative system wants that an agent a makes the institutional
fact y true if x holds in context C and believes that the effect of action z of agent a is
the institutional fact y.
Before introducing the more concrete level of abstraction in obligations we discuss
the third level of constitutive norms which is based on the notion of delegation of power.
Definition 10 (Counts-as relation (level 3) and delegation of power). Let NMAS
be a normative multiagent system 〈A,X,B,D,G,AD , E,RD ,≥,≥E,n, I, V,GD〉.
a ∈ A is an agent, z ∈ Xa an action of agent a, x ∈ Lit(X) is a literal built out of a
variable, y ∈ Lit(I) a literal built out of an institutional fact, C ⊆ Lit(X) the context.
Agent a has been delegated the power to consider x in context C as the institutional
fact y, NMAS |= delegatedn(a, z, x, y|C), iff:
1. C ∧ x → y ∈ out(Dn,≥n) ∩ out(GD(a),≥n): it is a desire of the normative
system and a goal distributed to agent a that in context C the fact x is considered
as the institutional fact y.
2. ∃z ∈ Xa such that C∪{z} → y ∈ out(Bn,≥n): there exists an action z of agent a
such that if it decides z then the normative system believes that the institutional
fact y follows (i.e., counts-as1n(z, y|C) at the first level of abstraction).
If NMAS |= delegatedn(a, z, x, y|C), then NMAS |= counts-as3n(x, y|C),
Example 11. b ∈ A,P \ I = {catalytic}, I = {eco}, Xa = {drive}, Xb = {stamp}
Dn = GD(b) = {d3},RD(d3) = catalytic → eco
Bn = {b1}, RD(b1) = stamp → eco
Thus, NMAS |= delegatedn(b, stamp, catalytic, eco|). Note that with respect to
Example 9, the goal d3 is distributed to agent b and stamp is an action of agent b.
We can now define obligations where agents have been delegated the power of recogniz-
ing violations by means of actions which count as such. Differently from the obligation
of level 2, clause 2 distributes a goal to agent b who is in charge of recognizing viola-
tions and whose action z is believed by the normative system n to be the recognition of
a violation (clause 7).
Definition 11 (Obligation (level 3)). Let NMAS be a normative multiagent system
〈A,X,B,D,G,AD , E,RD ,≥,≥E,n, I, V,GD〉. Agent a ∈ A is obliged to see to
it that x ∈ Lit(Xa ∪ P ) with sanction s ∈ Lit(Xb ∪ P ) in context Y ⊆ Lit(X)
in NMAS , written as NMAS |= O3an(x, s|Y ), if and only if ∃b ∈ A and a decision
variable z ∈ Xb such that Definition 8 holds except that:
2. Y ∪ {∼x} → V (∼x,a) ∈ out(Dn,≥n) ∩ out(GD(b),≥n): if Y holds and ∼x
is true , then agent n has distributed the goal V (∼x,a): that it is recognized as a
violation in context Y .
7. Y ∪{z} → V (∼x,a) ∈ out(Bn,≥n): from action z of agent b is believed to follow
the recognition of the violation.
From clause 2 and 7 it follows that agent b has been delegated the power to recognize
violations by means of its action z.
NMAS |= ∃b ∈ A, z ∈ Xb delegatedn(b, z,∼x, V (∼x,a) | Y )
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Note that clause 2 of the definition above is like the first clause of an obligation
Obn(V (∼ x,a), s′ | Y ∪ {∼x}). The model can thus be extended with obligations
towards agents which have to take care of the procedural aspects of law, like prosecut-
ing violations and sanctioning violators. These additional obligations are discussed in
[19] and provide a motivation for the prosecuting and sanctioning agents. In the Italian
law, for example, it is obligatory for an attorney to start a prosecution process when he
comes to know about a crime (art. 326 of Codice di procedura penale).
6 Conclusions and Related Work
In this paper we introduce the notion of delegation of power which elaborates the
counts-as relation extending it to cope with some real situations. We show that counts-as
relations in some cases depend on the action of agents which are in charge of recogniz-
ing facts as institutional facts. Moreover, we show that these agents are motivated to do
so by a goal delegated to them by the normative system. If these two conditions are true
we say that the agents have been delegated a power. Once we define the delegation of
power relation, we can use it to extend our sanction based definition of obligations in
order to model agents which prosecute violations.
Our model allows to distinguish three levels of abstractions: at the higher level of ab-
straction violations, sanctions and institutional facts follow without the intervention of
any agent. At the middle level the normative system acts to satisfy its goal to recognize
violations, to sanction and to establish institutional facts. At the most concrete level,
agents are in charge of achieving the goals of the normative system and are empowered
to do so.
The notion of empowerment in normative multiagent systems is widely discussed,
but it has not been related yet with the notion of goal delegation.
Pacheco and Santos [25], for example, discuss the delegation of obligations among
roles. In particular, they argue that when an obligation is delegated, a corresponding
permissions must be delegated too. This rationality constraint inside an institution par-
allels our notion of delegation of power: when the goal to make true an institutional fact
is delegated, the agent must be empowered to do so too. Moreover, in our model we
can add to the notion of delegation of power also the permission for the delegated agent
to perform the action which counts as the delegated institutional fact. This can be done
using the definition of permission given in [8].
Pacheco and Santos consider the delegation process among roles rather than among
agents. This feature can be added to our model too, using the framework for roles
we discuss in [13]. Note that our model of roles describes roles by means of beliefs
and goals; it is, thus, compatible with the distribution of goals to agents described by
clause 2 of Definition 11.
Gelati et al. [26] combine obligations and power to define the notion of mandate in
contracts: “a mandate is a proclamation intended to create the obligation of exercising
a declarative power”. However, they do not apply their analysis to the definition of
constitutive rules but to the normative positions among agents.
Comparison with other models of counts-as is discussed in [6] and [14].
Future work is studying the relation between regulative rules and delegation of
power: defining how it is possible to create global policies [8] obliging or permitting
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other agents to delegate their power. Finally, abstraction in the input/output logic
framework has been left for lions or input/output networks. In such networks each black
box corresponding to an input/output logic is associated with a component in an archi-
tecture. A discussion can be found in [14].
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